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On the Orthodox Nature of Heterodox Income
Distribution Theory
By Ross Nichols

Abstract
The goal of this paper is to show that orthodox and heterodox theories of personal
income distribution developed in the mid-twentieth century are effectively
identical, despite their claims to the contrary. While segmented labor market
theory contends that neoclassical theories of personal income distribution, such as
human capital theory, ignore the impact of social institutions on the labor market,
human capital theory actually implicitly incorporates them. Social institutions
are, therefore, just as important in the orthodox approach to personal income
distribution. Yet, while this is the case, the heterodox perspective is valuable
because of the stress it places on social institutions, the importance of which is not
always explicitly recognized in human capital theory.

Introduction:
A.B. Atkinson titled his 1996 Presidential Address to the Royal
Economic Society, “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold.”

His

rationale for doing so was that income distribution in the twentieth century was
studied mainly through the lens of development economics, and that it therefore
neglected the theory behind income distribution itself (Atkinson, 1997, 299).
He believed that economists placed too much emphasis on studying the effects
of income distribution at the cost of failing to attempt to understand the causes
of income distribution. The study of income distribution had diverged from
explaining “how the economy works” (ibid., 299). Atkinson urged the need for
economics to collaborate with other social sciences to incorporate the importance
of social norms into income distribution analysis because “a subject so central
to social science as income distribution is one that we [economists] cannot solve
on our own, and…a receptiveness to outside ideas [is] a sign of a discipline in
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good health” (ibid., 318). Building an adequate income distribution theory thus
required an interdisciplinary approach. But what Atkinson, as a representative of
contemporary mainstream economics, failed to recognize was that great strides
had been made in income distribution theory during the twentieth century. A
renaissance had occurred several decades earlier that was of paramount importance
to the theory of income distribution. Theories of personal income distribution
emerged during the mid-twentieth century.
A study of the rebirth of income distribution theory naturally raises
questions concerning the timing of this renaissance. One of the main goals of
classical political economy was to explain how income was distributed between
classes. During that time, a tension developed between the classical theory of
income distribution and its Marxian critique that stemmed from the implications
Ricardo and Marx drew from their respective class theories of income distribution.
Renewed vigor of theoretical work on income distribution occurred in the midtwentieth century and led to a seemingly much more decisive split between
neoclassical economists and their critics. Whereas the theoretical foundations of
Ricardian and Marxian theories of income distribution were similar, heterodox
economists argued that the logic underpinning neoclassical theories of income
distribution was flawed.
Sahota (1977) found human capital theory to be one of the most
complete theories of personal income distribution developed by the neoclassicals.
Human capital theory drew closely upon the theory of marginal productivity
to explain how income was distributed between individuals rather than social
classes. Instead of analyzing income distribution within the context of capitalists
and laborers, the focus of income distribution theory shifted to an analysis of
how income was distributed between labor and capital as factors of production.
Segmented labor market theory was introduced as a neo-Marxian critique of
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human capital theory. 6 It was based on the argument that sociopolitical forces
sorted workers into distinct and rigid labor markets. Individual incomes were
thus largely the product of class relations in the workplace. Segmented labor
market theory argued that “the law of one price will not prevail in labor markets,
even in the long run” (Rebitzer, 1993, 1411). The rebirth of interest in income
distribution thus appeared to generate a wide split between competing theories of
personal income distribution. Segmented labor market theory criticized human
capital theory for neglecting the role of social institutions in the distribution of
personal income.
Closer analysis of human capital theory and segmented labor market
theory, however, reveals that these two theories are essentially equivalent. Rebitzer
(1993) cites several instances of neoclassical economists incorporating the notion
of segmented labor markets into their work, but the relationship between human
capital theory and segmented labor market theory is much closer than previous
literature implies. Therefore not only is it important to study the rebirth of
income distribution in the mid-twentieth as a reminder to contemporary economic
discourse of the theoretical work done on income distribution during this time, the
mid-twentieth century also produced a heated debate between neoclassicals and
neo-Marxists concerning the explanation of the distribution of personal income.
And while Rebitzer acknowledges that these opposing views were reconciled to
an extent, this paper will show that human capital theory and segmented labor
market theory are even more fundamentally similar than Rebitzer suggests. In
short, a better understanding of how income distribution theory was “brought in
from the cold,” and the implications associated with this revival, is needed.
6

Both neo-Marxists and neo-institutionalists advocate forms of segmented labor market theory.
While Osterman, Rebitzer and Piore are referenced in the text, they are considered neo-institutionalists. Since the purpose of this paper is to compare segmented labor market theory with
human capital theory rather than examine the various forms of segmented labor market theory,
the two groups are not differentiated.
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The following analysis is divided into six sections. The first section
examines the origins of income distribution theory in classical and Marxian
economics, and show that classical political economy never attempted to develop
a theory of personal income distribution. In the second section, I discuss how
Clark’s theory of marginal productivity served as a bridge to the development
of theories of personal income distribution in the mid-twentieth century. In the
third section, I analyze the circumstances that contributed to the rise of theories
of personal income distribution and present the theoretical foundations of human
capital theory. I also examine the criticisms of human capital theory. The fourth
section focuses on the critique of human capital theory developed by radical
political economy in an effort to show how segmented labor market theory
emerged as an important heterodox explanation of personal income distribution.
The fifth section shows that orthodox and heterodox explanations of personal
income distribution share close theoretical foundations and are thus effectively
identical explanations for the distribution of personal income. The only discernible
difference between the two is the emphasis placed on social institutions. In the
final section, I briefly summarize my findings.
I.

Classical and Marxian Theories of Income Distribution
Writing at the height of classical political economy, Ricardo believed

that income distribution was so important to political economy that economics
should be defined as “an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the
produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation” (Ricardo,
1951, 278). In short, Ricardo contended that the distribution of income was the
machine that drove the economy. Explaining the rate of profit was one of the main
goals of Ricardo’s Principles.
Ricardo argued that “the produce of the earth – all that is derived
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from its surface by the united application of labour, machinery, and capital, is
divided among three classes of the community” (Ricardo, 1821, v). The profits
that accrued to capitalists were the product of capitalist relationships with both
landlords and laborers. Ricardo accepted the Malthusian theory of population
and its attendant assumption that rapid population growth would drive wages
down to the subsistence level. Profits were thus governed by a socially and
morally7 determined level of subsistence. Yet while profits were determined by
the subsistence wage level, the subsistence wage and technology level was in
turn determined by “the quantity of labour requisite to provide necessaries for
the labourers, on that land or with that capital that yields no rent” (ibid., 128). In
effect, the profits of capitalists were determined by the extent to which infertile
land was being used to grow the crops on which workers subsisted.
There was thus a tendency for the rate of profit “to fall; for, in the progress
of society and wealth, the additional quantity of food required is obtained by the
sacrifice of more and more labour” (ibid, 120). As society progressed, increasingly
less fertile land came under cultivation which subsequently increased the amount of
rent collected by landlords. This made food more expensive, forcing capitalists to
pay higher wages and keep a smaller portion of their revenue. Furthermore, a high
rate of profit attracted outside capital so competition depressed profit rates, but “a
fall in the general rate of profits is by no means incompatible with a partial rise of
profits” (ibid., 119). Capitalists could therefore experience positive profits despite
declining rates of profit due to counteracting influences such as increased demand.
Karl Marx agreed with the general framework of class income distribution
theory laid out by Ricardo. He too believed that there was a tendency for the rate
of profits to fall and wages to fluctuate around the subsistence level. Non-wage
7

Ricardo argues that the natural wage in a country “essentially depends on the habits and
customs of the people” in a given country (Ricardo, 91). That is, the level of sustenance that is
acceptable in one country is not necessarily the same in all countries. If a worker lives in a society with high wants, their wage will be higher than if they lived in a society of simpler means.
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income was accepted as a residual measurement. Marx, however, thought two
important aspects of class income distribution needed to be addressed. First, he
differentiated between labor and labor power. Labor power “is to be understood
[as] the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human
being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description”
(Marx, 1867, 167). Marx believed that labor power was a commodity sold by
laborers. Whereas labor power was the potential to do work, “labour-power in
use is labour itself” (ibid., 177). Labor was thus the act of realizing the ability to
work. This distinction was important because it is the foundation for his concept
of surplus value. Humans had a capacity to work much greater than the amount of
labor we need to expend to replenish this potential. Marx referred to the portion
of the working day needed to earn enough for subsistence “‘necessary’ labor
time” (ibid., 217). Any labor expended beyond this point generated surplus value
for capitalists.
Capitalists therefore paid laborers just enough to ensure their subsistence
but extracted an excessively large amount of labor compared to the amount of
labor necessary for subsistence. Marx also argued that wages tended towards
subsistence, but his rationale for why this occurred was different from Ricardo’s.
Marx rejected the Malthusian theory of population as an explanation for the
tendency of wages to fluctuate around the subsistence level. He instead believed
that an “industrial reserve army” of unemployed workers was maintained by
capitalists in order to foster competition between laborers and prevent wage
increases (ibid., 632). Furthermore, the presence of an industrial reserve army
resulted from the historical evolution of capitalism. As capitalism progressed,
capitalists accumulated increasingly more capital.

The majority of this

accumulation was ever more productive physical capital. Demand for variable
capital (i.e. labor) therefore grew at “constantly diminishing rate” because it
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became a smaller and smaller portion of total capital (ibid., 629). According
to Marx, downward pressure on wages was thus not a natural occurrence but
rather a phenomenon specific to the historical conditions of the capitalist mode
of production.
Classical and Marxian income distribution theories shared similar
foundations. While Marx sought to improve upon Ricardian theory, the biggest
difference between the two was the nature of capitalism.

Ricardo argued

that since capitalists would only produce commodities for which there was
sufficient demand, capitalists would naturally seek to accumulate capital up to
the point where profits equaled zero (Ricardo, 340). A decreasing rate of profit
was attributable to higher wages made necessary by the diminishing marginal
productivity of agriculture. Accumulation was thus portrayed as a self-regulating
phenomenon that ensured stability in capitalism. Ricardo acknowledged the
existence of intense competition between capitalists to accumulate capital, but did
not believe that capital necessarily became concentrated within an ever smaller
group of capitalists.
Marx rejected the notion that accumulation was governed by the rate of
profit. He contended that accumulation was necessary for capitalist survival in
the capitalist mode of production:
“the development of capitalist production makes it constantly
necessary to keep increasing the amount of capital…and competition
makes the immanent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each
individual capitalist, as external coercive laws. It compels him to keep
constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it” (ibid., 592).

Accumulation fostered vicious competition between capitalists, the losers in which
did not survive. Marx believed that as capital became concentrated in a shrinking
group of capitalists, capitalists would exert a greater degree of exploitation of the
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working class. Ultimately, this desire for accumulation would contribute to the
downfall of capitalism after a critical mass of degraded proletariats was reached,
sparking a popular revolt against the capitalists (ibid., 763). While Ricardo
asserted that the desire for accumulation could wane peacefully, Marx depicted a
much more urgent picture of capital accumulation.
Obstacles to an Analysis of Personal Income Distribution
There are two important reasons why Ricardo and Marx never attempted
to develop a theory of personal income distribution. Class conflict caused a rise
in class consciousness that hindered the ability of Ricardo and Marx to analyze
income on a personal level. It simply did not make sense for Ricardo and Marx
to study how personal income distribution when people increasingly identified
themselves as members of a class rather than as individuals. This is exemplified
in the controversy surrounding the Corn Laws, where capitalists and landlords
competed to attain supremacy in the public arena. Whichever class prevailed was
effectively able to dictate how income was distributed between classes. Capitalists
and landlords viewed themselves as part of a greater class movement rather
than individual members of society. In addition, the labor force of the time was
relatively more homogenous than it is today. This made it difficult to differentiate
workers or treat them as individual economic agents. Ricardo and Marx, at least
from an economic perspective, would have had difficulty distinguishing between
individual members of a given class.
Ricardo and Marx lived in an era when class conflict was at the center
of policymaking in Europe. Class distributions of income reflected economists’
perspectives on class conflict. The controversy over the British Corn Laws
demonstrated the tension between landlords and capitalists that persisted during
the rise of classical political economy. Landlords favored implementing the Corn
Laws because protection from foreign competition allowed landlords to charge
68

higher rents. Capitalists wanted to keep food prices as low as possible because the
subsistence level depended upon the price at which workers could feed themselves
in order to restore their labor power. Cheaper food meant higher profits for
capitalists. While enacting the Corn Laws seemed to favor the landlords and their
repeal appeared to cater to the interests of the urban capitalists, class conflict was
much more complex than a dispute between capitalists and landlords. Conflict
also arose between members of the same social class as class distinctions blurred.
One instance of intra-class tension arose between established landlords
and newly landed capitalists. Many established landlords favored legislation that
“served to reinforce the status of the existing elites of both town and
countryside by re-emphasizing the notion that the prosperity of the
various classes which composed the same interest group was primarily
affected not by one another but by a rival interest group [the urban
capitalists],” (Moore, 1965, 544).

The Corn Laws thus strove to maintain the status quo of class relations in
British society. That hierarchy survived mainly on the mutual interest among
well-established landed and capitalist elites to preserve traditional British social
structure. Yet as industry expanded in Great Britain, the formerly mutual interests
between rural and urban elites diverged. Capitalists sought cheap food to keep
production costs down but established, or hereditary, landlords wanted prices to
remain high. Hereditary landlords sought to maintain prosperity through high
agricultural prices, but an “arriviste” class of newly landed elites who had made
a fortune in the cities strove to reap profits by implementing innovative farming
techniques that increased crop production (ibid., 551). Social standing of older
landed elites was further undermined by capitalists who purchased land in order
to accumulate more capital. As the pace of capital accumulation accelerated
and landed capitalists subsequently gained influence, older landlords felt their
authority in the public arena begin to wane.
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The eventual repeal of the Corn Laws ultimately benefited the capitalist
class because foreign competition lowered food prices, but Sir Robert Peel’s
official justification for presenting the necessary legislation was “to extricate the
kingdom from the social dilemmas” that arose from the incessant class disputes
in European society that dominated the era (ibid., 560). Thus while the repeal
of the Corn Laws had economic implications, it was more focused on achieving
social harmony. Peel wanted to encourage the hereditary landed elite to shift their
focus from prices to output, and thus develop an entrepreneurial outlook similar
to capitalists. Unfortunately, this legislation was misguided in that it “failed to
recognize the impossibility of commercializing the status of the landlord without
also commercializing the status of the tenant” (ibid., 559). Urban capitalists
emerged as the victors from repeal of the Corn Laws because legislators failed to
comprehend the nature of the rural hierarchy properly. The controversial nature of
the Corn Laws and their repeal was representative of the divide within classes that
existed during the rise of classical political economy and the critiques that quickly
followed. Since class conflict dominated European society, income distribution
was viewed as a class-based issue rather than one pertaining to individuals.
The relative homogeneity of the labor force also inhibited the ability
to differentiate between individuals. Reich, Gordon, and Edwards argued that
before the era of monopoly capitalism began in 1890, production was governed
by the rules of competitive capitalism (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 1973, 360).
Production was heavily standardized, primarily took place in factories, and involved
many simple tasks. Capitalists favored this type of production strategy because
strong competition disincentivized the extra expenses associated with the types of
specialized training that accompanied monopoly capitalism. Monopoly capitalism
was characterized by the production of differentiated good by specialized labor.
Furthermore, the dramatic rise in population and movement of unskilled workers
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into concentrated urban areas ensured that a large supply of easily substitutable
labor was readily available for capitalists to draw from (Brown, 1977, 72).
Increasing class consciousness and a relatively homogenous labor
force prevented Ricardo and Marx from examining the distribution of income
on a personal level. It did not make sense for them to study personal income
distribution when public debates such as those surrounding the Corn Laws were
class-based. Individuals were viewed more as members of a social class rather
than unique economic agents. The structure of industry during this era made
it even more difficult to study society on an individual level. Production often
centered on simple, repetitive tasks so labor was easily interchangeable.
II.

Marginal Productivity Theory
Ricardo first introduced the marginal principle to economic theory. He

argued that as less fertile land came under cultivation, the rent on more fertile land
increased (Ricardo, 1821, 60). John Bates Clark endeavored to expand Ricardo’s
marginal principle in two important ways. In his Distribution of Wealth, Clark
generalized the principle of substitution to include all factors of production, and
proposed that “the pay of labor in each industry tends to conform to the marginal
product of social labor employed in connection with a fixed amount of social
capital, as such” (Clark, 1899, 116; emphasis his). Although Clark articulated
an explanation of how the natural rates of profits and wages were determined
endogenously, he maintained the classical assumption that the endowments of
capital and labor were naturally determined. Consequently, while the theory of
marginal productivity inspired later theories of personal income distribution, it is
itself more a theory of factor demands than one of income distribution.
Clark developed his theory of marginal productivity as an analogue to
Ricardo’s explanation of rents. He imagined a “universal field for employment”
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that included all workers (ibid, 110). Those who had access to the central field
of fertile land or a sufficiently stocked store naturally had access to higher levels
of productivity. Workers located farther from this central field had to choose
from lower quality employment. In the zone of indifference, employers earned
zero profit and thus stopped hiring. Competition ensured that all employers hired
employees up to this point. The analogy of a universal field for employment is
important because of an important aspect Clark omitted from his discussion: he
did not explain how workers were placed throughout the field, or if it was possible
for them to move from their initial position. Their position was determined
naturally. During the rebirth of income distribution theory in the coming decades,
this assumption motivated human capital theory and segmented labor market
theory to explain how workers moved within the “universal field of employment.”
The theory of marginal productivity also maintained the classical
assumption of homogenous labor. Clark acknowledged that skilled workers were
more productive than unskilled workers, but argued that all labor could be measured
in the same units of labor (ibid., 63). He therefore assumed that all labor could
be reduced to a common denominator, which minimized the importance of skill
differential. A skilled worker could be replaced by two or more less-skilled workers.
Although Clark maintained these important classical assumptions, he departed from
the classical theory of income distribution in several important ways.
Foremost among Clark’s critiques of classical political economy was the
argument that Ricardian economics was an endeavor that “was really studying a
static…world with no complete idea of its nature,” which he addressed by relaxing
the assumption of a static economy (ibid., 69). Clark believed that economic
theory needed to reflect the dynamic nature of the world. The Distribution of
Wealth can thus be viewed as his attempt to complete Ricardo’s work. While
natural law remained a governing principal in that the productivity of workers was
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naturally determined, “social economic dynamics” such as increasing population
and wealth, technological innovation, introduction of new products, and labor
flow between groups were introduced (ibid., 73). Clark realized that the state of
the world in the present was not the same as it was in the past, and that it would
also be different in the future. Even though wages naturally tended to their natural
level, the dynamic nature of society had to be taken into account. The biggest
contribution Clark made to income distribution theory was that the determination
of wages adhered to natural law because they were equal to an exogenously
determined marginal productivity, while granting that these exogenous forces
changed over time. To put it concisely, “what we have to see is how static laws
operate in a dynamic state” (ibid., 403).
It is clear that Clark drew upon Ricardo when formulating his theory
of marginal productivity, yet there is also evidence that he did more than simply
apply the marginal principle to include all factors of production. Ricardo held
the proportion of capital to labor constant; his theory of rents, therefore, assumed
varying fertility of the soil. Clark varied the factors of production separately (ibid.,
163). While Ricardo assumed technology to be unchanging, the interchangeability
between labor and capital in The Distribution of Wealth implied that technological
change was an important aspect of production. This is an important implication
because it allowed human capital theory to maintain that labor was both dynamic
and highly substitutable, a necessary condition for the assumption of perfect
competition in the labor market underpinning human capital theory.
The Distribution of Wealth inspired future work on personal income
distribution theory through the introduction of the idea that workers were paid
according to their marginal productivity. Clark touted his work as “an inspiring
vista for future advances” in economic theory (ibid., 75). What he did not foresee,
however, were future attempts to treat social economic dynamics as endogenous
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to the explanation of personal income distribution. Relaxing the assumption of
natural skill determination served as the impetus for numerous theories of personal
income distribution. Whereas Clark took the distribution of factor endowments
as given, future work on income distribution sought to explain how marginal
productivity was determined. Theories of personal income distribution can be
seen as an extension of marginal productivity theory. While marginal productivity
closely identified with classical political economy, Clark’s work effectively broke
the hegemony of class income distribution in economic analysis.
III.

Theories of Personal Income Distribution

Circumstances Contributing to the Rise of Theories of Personal Income
Distribution
One of the reasons economic thought focused upon theories of personal
distribution during the renaissance of income distribution in the mid-twentieth
century was the widespread study of the causes of discrimination. Becker’s The
Economics of Discrimination (1957) was one of the pioneering works on the
subject. Becker argued that it was possible to conduct an economic analysis of the
effects of discrimination because “if an individual has a ‘taste for discrimination,’
he must act as if he were willing to pay something either directly or in form of
reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others” (Becker,
1971 (1957), 14). Employers associated non-pecuniary costs of production with
minority employees. This “taste” resulted from prejudice and ignorance, and
varied both temporally and spatially.
Although Becker believed that discrimination in the labor force existed,
he also believed the forces creating discrimination were dynamic. The level of
discrimination present in the work place could thus change over time. To test
this, he measured the change in average occupational position for both whites
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and minorities from 1910-1950. Relative occupational position was measured by
comparing the income for skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled minorities with the
average incomes for their respective white counterparts. Becker found that the
relative occupational position of minority workers had remained stable over time
(ibid., 140). Discrimination had therefore not decreased. An absolute increase
in income for minorities did not necessarily imply an increase in their position
relative to whites because the incomes of white employees increased as well.
The Economics of Discrimination served as an impetus for numerous
studies examining the impact of discrimination. Rayack (1961) and Gilman
(1965) criticized Becker’s arguments about the persistence and magnitude of
discrimination in the workplace, respectively. Rayack argued that Becker’s
conclusion of an unchanged level of discrimination towards blacks, as measured
by their income relative to whites in the first half of the twentieth century resulted
from the erroneous construction of his occupational index (Rayack, 1961, 210).
Rayack believed Becker did not account for the fact that blacks were heavily
concentrated in semi-skilled and unskilled professions. After generating an
occupational index that factored in this characteristic, Rayack showed that
income for blacks had, in general, increased more than it had for whites so that by
1957 the occupational position of blacks had increased by 34 percent relative to
1900 (ibid., 211). He also contended, however, that this increase did not reflect
a decrease in discrimination. The increase was instead due to increased demand
for labor, and any sustained increase in occupational position was “substantially,
a function of the tightness of the labor market” (ibid., 214). Becker could thus
be correct in his assessment that the level of discrimination in the labor force
had remained unchanged throughout the twentieth century and simultaneously
incorrect in his belief that the position of blacks in the workplace had improved
neither absolutely nor relatively.
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Gilman (1965) provided a further critique of The Economics of
Discrimination.

He believed that the impact of discrimination on minority

unemployment was significantly smaller than initially thought (Gilman, 1965,
1080). This evidence challenged the notion that minorities were targeted in the
hiring-firing process. Gilman drew a conclusion similar to Rayack (1961) by
suggesting that discrimination was most evident in wage rigidity. Minorities
experienced greater wage rigidity and thus higher unemployment rates because
“the greater the pressure in an occupation or region for nonwhite-white wage
equality, the greater will be the gap between equilibrium and actual wages, and
the greater will be the reduction in employment opportunities for nonwhite
relative to white workers” (ibid., 1091). Minimum wage laws and unions keep
the actual wage above the equilibrium wage. The greater this disparity, the fewer
employment opportunities for minority workers there would be.
Regardless of the extent to which discrimination existed, one reason it
endured in the labor market was imperfect information. Gathering information on
potential employees was costly, which made it difficult for minorities and females
to show that they were equally as skilled as their white male counterparts. Arrow
(1971) claimed that minorities and women were paid less than equally skilled white
male employees because “skin color and sex are cheap sources of information”
(Arrow, 1971, 25). Employers had preconceived notions of the productivity of
women and minorities, and imperfect information in the labor market allowed
these prejudices to persist. There was less incentive for female and minority
workers to make the investments necessary to increase their productivity because
no amount of investment could outweigh the cheap information provided by their
skin color or gender (ibid., 29). Therefore while a minority or female worker and
a white worker could begin with the same productive potential, the latter would be
more likely to realize this potential and thus enjoy a better occupational position.
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Marxists viewed discrimination differently.

While neoclassical

economists treated the origins of discrimination as exogenous to the capitalist
system of production, Marxists believed that discrimination was perpetuated
endogenously. Capitalists implemented various forms of discrimination as a
means to prevent camaraderie among workers (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards,
361). Employers exploited ethnicity, race, and sex to ensure competing factions
of workers who would not compromise capitalist hegemony. They hired groups
of rival nationalities to antagonize each other. Jobs were “race-typed” and
women were paid less than men as a means of forcing these workers to accept
submissive roles in society (ibid., 362). As capitalism evolved beyond a relatively
homogenous labor force, capitalists stoked race conflicts and other forms of social
unrest to ensure their continued perch atop the social hierarchy.
Such an emphasis in academia on discrimination encouraged
development of theories of personal income distribution because discrimination
was fundamentally based on the notion that not all workers were the same.
Employers assumed that white male workers were superior to other workers even
if the “intrinsic identities” between workers were equal (Arrow, 1971, 28). The
presence and influence of discrimination required that laborers no longer be viewed
as homogenous members of a social class but instead be considered individual
economic agents. When studying income distribution, economists acknowledged
that individuals faced different environments and constraints that influenced their
position in the labor force. There was thus a need to conduct economic analyses
on a personal level. Becker foreshadowed the rise of human capital theory in The
Economics of Discrimination by mentioning that a relationship existed between
economic capacity and “the capital invested in [people] through education”
(Becker, 1971 (1957), 112).
The notion of heterogeneity in the labor force was an important
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implication of the discussion on discrimination. Incorporating a heterogeneous
labor-force into income distribution analysis became necessary because people
could no longer be sorted into broad categories such as laborers and capitalists.
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) studied heterogeneity within the labor market
from a historical perspective. They asserted that the captains of industry sought
to capture control over product and factor markets because they had been relieved
of the competitive pressures inherent in the previous stage of capitalism (Reich,
Gordon, and Edwards, 1973, 361). In order to establish themselves in product
markets, capitalists of the new age of capitalism had to differentiate themselves
from their competitors in order to survive. Yet while product differentiation
conferred the indirect benefits of monopoly capitalism, Reich, Gordon, and
Edwards pointed out another, more sinister and explicit motive for promoting
heterogeneity in the labor force that accompanied the rise of monopoly capitalism.
Reich, Edwards and Gordon argued that capitalists encouraged a shift
away from homogenization in the labor force “to break down the increasingly
unified worker interests that grew out of the proletarianization of work” (Reich,
Edwards and Gordon, 1973, 361). They believed that a homogenous labor force
fostered a sense of unity among the workers that threatened the consolidation of
power in the capitalist class. A strategy of “divide and conquer” was therefore
needed to quash any semblance of solidarity in the labor force (ibid., 361). Thus
while heterogeneity of the labor-force may have arisen with the evolution of
capitalism, it was perpetuated by the capitalists as a preventative measure against
class cohesion amongst laborers.
There were also studies conducted within a neoclassical framework that
showed evidence of heterogeneity of the contemporary labor force. Gallaway
(1967) found that although workers responded positively to earnings, distance
acted as a deterrent to job mobility. Workers thus did not always move to regions
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paying higher wages (Gallaway, 1967, 465). The decision to forego a higher
income was rational because the uncertainty due to imperfect information created
trade-off costs between distance and earnings. Workers faced a higher degree of
uncertainty with longer distances because distance acted as an “information filter
which inhibits the flow of labor market knowledge between areas” (ibid, 472).
Trade-off costs became increasingly large with distance so workers were less
likely to move in order to gain a marginal increase in income. Wages therefore
did not necessarily equalize across regions; differences in incomes for identical
jobs could persist.
Gallaway (1967) also found evidence that labor was not easily
substitutable. Trade-off costs were not limited only to distance, skill also acted
as a barrier to entry for employment in an industry (ibid., 471). Workers from
some industries faced more restrictive barriers to entry than workers from other
industries because labor was specialized. A wide range of trade-off costs existed
across industries: workers in professions with higher trade-off costs embodied less
transferable skills as a result of extended parochial training (ibid., 472). Workers
who thus received highly specialized training were not able to find alternate
employment outside of their chosen industry and earn an income comparable to
the one they received in their former industry. Specialization of skills in the labor
force therefore greatly affected the ability of workers to switch professions. Both
interregional and inter-industry heterogeneity therefore challenged the classical
assumption of homogeneity within the labor force.
Analyses of discrimination and labor force heterogeneity facilitated
a renaissance of interest in income distribution theory.

They signaled that

labor could no longer be viewed through the perspective of classical political
economy. Workers could no longer be viewed as easily interchangeable. But
while discrimination and heterogeneity of the labor force identified the need for
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a reevaluation of income distribution, these studies did not develop theories of
personal income distribution on their own. Human capital theory and segmented
labor market theory offered competing explanations of how discrimination and
heterogeneity within the labor force influenced personal income distribution. For
instance, discrimination encouraged segmented labor markets, but “discrimination
itself does not create the segmentation” (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 698). Human
capital theory sought to “single out individual investment behavior as a basic
factor in the heterogeneity of labor incomes” (Mincer, 1970, 6). Theories of
personal income distribution that emerged during the rebirth of thought on income
distribution were thus influenced by the prominent issues of the mid-twentieth
century.
Human Capital Theory
Human capital theory operated under the assumption that individuals
decided to invest in training or education that allowed them to obtain the skills
that made them more productive and consequently determined their income
(Becker, 1962, 9). The distribution of personal income could thus be explained
through an analysis of the distribution of human capital among participants in
the labor force. Human capital theorists argued that demand for this training and
education was determined by the marginal rate of return on investment, and that
its supply was determined by the volume of funds available for an individual
to acquire training or investment (Mincer, 1970, 18). Wage rates were market
prices that reflected the relative scarcity or surplus of different types of labor. This
explanation of the personal distribution of income was thoroughly grounded in
neoclassical economics.
Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz, and Gary Becker were the pioneers
of human capital theory. All three acknowledged that human capital was a
broad term that included components such as physical health and psychological
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well-being, but they agreed that training was the most important type of human
capital formation. Mincer (1958) constructed a model examining the effect of
investment on human capital under the assumption of rational choice. He argued
that individuals chose the amount of training they wanted based on their perceived
learning capacity (Mincer, 1958, 286). People with greater learning capacities
chose to acquire more training and enter professions requiring more training.
Furthermore, earnings within a profession fell along a “life-path” where older
workers earned more than younger workers (ibid., 288). Mincer suggested that
workers gained experience the longer they worked in a profession, which increased
their productivity and income. Professions that required more training also paid
higher salaries because they required longer postponement of earnings (Mincer,
1970, 7). Higher incomes were thus partly compensation for the shortened period
during which those who received the training enjoyed returns on their investment.
Personal income distribution was determined by the initial decision of how much
training to acquire and how much on-the-job training a worker obtained in their
chosen profession.
Schultz (1961) built upon Mincer’s work by contending that the decision
to invest in human capital was influenced by the expected return on investment.
He asserted that while “any capability produced by human investment becomes
part of the human agent and hence cannot be sold; it is nevertheless ‘in touch
with the marketplace’ by affecting the wages and salaries the human agent can
earn” (Schultz, 1961, 8). Similar to Mincer, Schultz concluded that people who
benefited the most from investment in human capital were the most likely to
invest the greatest amount in training. Schultz’s analysis diverged from Mincer’s,
however, in the type of training studied. Schultz focused on measuring the
returns to formal education because he believed that the exact role of on-thejob training in modern industry was not adequately understood (ibid., 10). He
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argued that formal education had taken over a significant portion of the training
and preparation traditionally acquired through on-the-job training arrangements
such as apprenticeships. Schultz chose to study how the stock of education in
the labor force affected economic growth. He asserted that a more educated
labor force was a more productive labor force and found that between 1900 and
1956, the stock of education in the labor force grew twice as fast as the stock of
reproducible capital (ibid., 11). It was therefore greater educational attainment,
and subsequently higher levels of human capital, that drove American economic
growth in the first half of the twentieth century.
Perhaps the most comprehensive promotion of human capital theory
advocated during the rebirth of income distribution theory was Human Capital
and the Personal Distribution of Income by Becker (1967). He constructed a
model of income distribution similar to Mincer’s by incorporating the assumptions
of rational choice and variable life-paths of earnings. Furthermore human capital
was discussed mostly in the context of educational attainment. But rather than
simply reviewing earlier work, Becker also wanted to expand “our rudimentary
knowledge of the forces generating income distributions” (Becker, 1967, 12).
Therefore while Mincer and Schultz identified the causes of the skewness of
income distribution, Becker undertook to explain them better.
Becker first summarized two special cases of the distribution of human
capital. Under the “egalitarian” approach, he assumed that all people faced the
same demand conditions for human capital and that income was determined by the
supply of opportunities to invest in human capital faced by individuals. In short,
the egalitarian approach proposed equal capacity to benefit from investment in
human capital, and that differences in environment determined the distribution of
human capital (ibid., 13). Income variances could be explained by family wealth,
subsidies and factors such as luck that shifted the supply curve for human capital
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outward. The “elite” approach was essentially the opposite. It presumed supply
conditions to be identical and that demand for human capital was determined
by the amount of investment in training and education (ibid., 16). More able
workers, for instance, were more likely to invest in human capital and thus have a
higher demand for it.
Becker believed that in reality, social institutions influenced both the
supply and demand for human capital (ibid., 24). Students with greater natural
ability not only had greater demand for human capital, their exceptional capacities
also made them likelier to attend better schools and make them more attractive
scholarship applicants. Legislation aimed at eradicating poverty shifted the
supply curve of human capital for less wealthy people outward, thereby reducing
the cost of investment. Through his analysis Becker provided a comprehensive
explanation for how investment in human capital determined the personal
distribution of income.
In the twentieth century, economists began to shift their focus from away
from explaining the class distribution of income and towards analyses of the
distribution of income among individuals. This change was motivated by studies
on economics of discrimination and increasing heterogeneity of the labor force.
Clark’s theory of marginal productivity first broached the notion of disaggregating
classes, and served as the foundation for human capital theory, the most influential
neoclassical theory of personal income distribution that emerged during the
renaissance of income distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century. Mincer,
Shultz, and Becker developed human capital theory to explain how the marginal
productivity of workers was determined, and thus develop a more comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between wages and marginal productivity.
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Criticisms of Human Capital Theory
Three basic criticisms arose in response to human capital theory. One
group of economists cited various econometric issues with studies that measured
the impact of investment in human capital on output. Griliches (1977) asserted
that an “ability” problem and the possible influence of optimizing behavior on
schooling decisions by individuals had not been addressed in models constructed
in the framework of human capital theory. Ability accounted for the possibility that
a given level of investment in human capital yielded varying returns depending
on the person. Including an ability variable in empirical analyses, however,
proved troublesome because it was difficult to measure (Griliches, 1977, 6).
Optimization of schooling decisions was troublesome for human capital theory
because such behavior was based on anticipated future earnings. Calculating
the optimal level of schooling or on-the-job training implicitly required strong
assumptions about individual behavior, which Griliches argued models of human
capital theory failed to recognize. For instance, while there was initially a positive
relationship between age and experience, older workers also reached a point
where they became less productive than younger workers (ibid., 14). Human
capital theory therefore implicitly assumed infinite life, even though it argued
that jobs requiring more training required higher compensation due to a shorter
working life. Furthermore, he also stated that since optimal schooling decisions
were based on anticipated earnings, any difference between ex-post and ex-ante
incomes increased the correlation between the schooling and residual terms in a
model measuring income (ibid., 13).
Blaug (1976) was also critical of the econometric viability of human
capital theory.

Measuring the effect of on-the-job training on income was

especially problematic because the various aspects of on-the-job training were not
adequately defined. He contended that human capital theory did not differentiate
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between increased productivity from costless learning-by-doing and costly selfinvestment (Blaug, 1976, 839). Human capital theory therefore did not provide
sufficient measures of on-the-job training by limiting itself to general and specific
training. Blaug faulted human capital theory models for producing significant,
unexplained differences in returns to investment in different types of human
capital as well. These discrepancies were due to the neglect of variations in
educational quality and the existence of an “overtaking point” (ibid., 838). The
benefits of schooling grew over time rather than being fully realized immediately
after schooling was completed. Blaug attributed these measurement errors to the
overly ambitious nature of human capital theory. He believed the focus of human
capital theory was too broad, making it difficult to determine “what hypothesis is
being tested” (ibid., 832).
Advocates of the screening hypothesis constituted another group critical
of human capital theory. They asserted that the assumption of perfect information
in labor markets was unrealistic. Economic theory needed to reflect the high
degree of imperfect information employers faced when reviewing job applicants.
Supporters of the screening hypothesis agreed that human capital theory was
correct in that individual incomes were determined by the level of investment
in human capital, but they developed a different explanation for how human
capital affected income. The link between human capital theory and the principle
of marginal productivity did not explain personal income distribution because
a “diploma serves primarily as an imperfect measure of performance ability
rather than as evidence of acquired skills” (Arrow, 1973, 193). The screening
hypothesis essentially argued that education separated more able workers from
less able workers. Income was determined by ability, not productivity. Stiglitz
(1975) contended that educational screening occurred naturally in society because
it was the “byproduct” of providing knowledge and career direction to students in
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schools (Stiglitz, 1975, 294). Bright students were identified by teachers who then
passed this information along the educational chain. School was used primarily to
sort students into levels of ability, not to develop skills to make more productive
workers, as human capital theory suggested.
Several important assumptions served as the foundation for the screening
hypothesis. Most important among them was the existence of inherent market
failure within the labor markets stemming from the lack of knowledge and cost
of obtaining information about potential employees (Taubman and Wales, 1975,
112). College diplomas were used by employers as a proxy for ability because
they offered quick insight into the skills and capabilities embodied in applicants.
As a result, the supply of labor for high-paying occupations is restricted to the
well-educated (ibid., 118). Stiglitz argued that access to information also affected
the decision making of job applicants. Individuals decided how much education
to invest in based on their perception of their ability. Risk-averse people therefore
chose to forego the chance of being screened as a below-average worker even
if they were highly capable (Stiglitz, 287). Yet while educational screening
was imperfect, Stiglitz cautioned against forbidding employers to practice it.
Screening would still occur, it would merely change forms. Forcing employers
to rely solely on on-the-job screening would make screening more expensive and
reduce output (ibid., 291). Everyone would be left worse off.
The screening hypothesis made a compelling case against the limitations
of human capital theory, but the former faced scrutiny on theoretical grounds
as well. In the development of his model supporting the screening hypothesis,
Arrow (1973) acknowledged that “employers cannot measure ability directly,
and there is no reason to suppose that the economist is going to do any better”
(Arrow, 216). Screening was based on the assumption that people have differing
levels of ability and that the more able use educational attainment to signal this.
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Yet if ability in general cannot be measured, it is nearly impossible to determine
its distribution. Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) also conducted an empirical
study based on Arrow’s work and obtained results challenging the predictions of
the screening hypothesis. For instance, they found that dropouts and students
who completed their coursework earned similar rates of return (Layard and
Psacharopoulos, 1974, 991). That challenged the notion put forth by the screening
hypothesis that a bachelor’s degree signaled to employers a more capable worker
than an applicant who completed only some coursework. Although the screening
hypothesis provided a neoclassical alternative to human capital theory, it failed
to unseat human capital theory as the primary explanation of personal income
distribution in orthodox economics.
IV.

Radical Political Economy
Radical political economy criticized human capital theory from a

heterodox perspective. Its supporters were less concerned with the empirical issues
of human capital theory, instead choosing to focus on the fundamental perception
of production in neoclassical economics. While neoclassical economics shifted
focus to the functional aspect of production with the introduction of the theory of
marginal productivity, radical political economy asserted that the social aspect of
production was the primary determinant of personal income. Marxists criticized
human capital theory for artificially resolving the inherent class conflict associated
with capitalist systems of production by considering every worker a capitalist
(Bowles and Gintis, 1975, 74). In fact, radical political economy questioned
human capital theory’s definition of capital. Learning could only be a form of
capital if it allowed workers to go into production on their own (ibid., 79).
Radical political economists challenged the notion that workers were
paid according to their marginal productivity because they believed that the
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structure of capitalist firms encouraged the de-skilling of their workers (Rebitzer,
1993, 1401). Essentially this meant that, rather than encouraging workers to
acquire more training in order to become more productive, they actually preferred
workers to embody only a minimum level of human capital. As a result they
became discouraged and the mundane nature of their work prevented them from
increasing, or even maintaining, their productivity. This is a contemporary restatement of the inevitable alienation of workers by capitalists espoused by Marx.
Human capital theory argued that higher productivity levels caused higher wages.
Radical political economy effectively argued the opposite: lower wages caused
productivity to fall. Workers embodied a natural endowment of “human capital”
that was augmented by schooling and training, but the economic return to these
investments was governed by the extent to which these same workers legitimated
the authority of firms over their employees (Bowles and Gintis, 1974, 80). Schools
were important, but not in the way human capital theory proposed. The main
goal of the education system was “to prepare students by developing attitudes
appropriate to the political position they can be expected to occupy within firms”
(Rebitzer, 1993, 1403). Marginal productivity was therefore unimportant to an
analysis of personal income distribution.
Since radical political economy criticized the theoretical foundations of
human capital theory, it can be viewed as a critique of the orthodox theory of
personal income distribution. Radical political economy was “not ready to reduce
the school system’s economically relevant activities to screening and labeling”
(ibid., 75). Imperfect information did exist in the labor market, but education was
not used as a signaling device to help more capable workers of signaling their
level of ability. The screening hypothesis was thus not a sufficient explanation
for the distribution of personal income distribution either. While radical political
economy acknowledged neoclassical economics’ contribution to the theory of
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personal income distribution, its explanations of personal income distribution
were incorrect. Marxist dissatisfaction with neoclassical theories of personal
income distribution led to the formation of their own theory of personal income
distribution: segmented labor market theory.

Segmented Labor Market Theory
While human capital theory explained differences in personal income
levels through a neoclassical perspective, segmented labor market theory sought to
explain personal income distribution in a Marxian framework. In this framework,
“political and economic forces within American capitalism have given rise to and
perpetuated segmented labor markets, and … it is incorrect to view the sources of
segmented labor markets as exogenous to the economic system” (Reich, Gordon,
and Edwards, 359). Instead of contending that the personal distribution of income
was determined by the functional aspect of production, proponents of segmented
labor market theory argued that it was mainly the result of the social aspect of
production. Wages and productivities applied to the jobs themselves, rather than
the individual workers occupying those positions (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 694).
Similar to the divide in classical political economy between Ricardo and Marx, a
split between neoclassicals and a group influenced by Marxism developed during
the renaissance of income distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century.
Segmented labor market theorists differentiated between primary and
secondary labor markets. The primary labor market comprised firms with market
power, sustainable sources of income, and the ability to pay above-subsistence
wages (Harrison and Sum, 1979, 689). Firms in this sector could afford to pay
for training for their employees because their market power allowed them to pass
some of the cost to consumers. Firms also invested in human capital to increase the
productivity of their workers. Consistent with Marxism, members of a relatively
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small group whose size was maintained by rigid entry requirements earned high
incomes while most workers toiled away in unattractive and unfulfilling jobs.
And since firms in the primary sector invested significant resources in training and
physical capital, jobs in this sector required stable working habits. The primary
labor market thus provided relatively stable employment. Due to higher wages
and greater stability, jobs in this sector were highly valued. Poor people were not
excluded from the primary segment merely for being lazy or lacking the capacity
for human capital necessary for entry into the primary segment. The institutional
framework of the capitalist system artificially restricted entry into the primary
labor market (ibid., 694). Poor people were poor mostly due to employment
prospects restricted to the secondary labor market.
Jobs in the secondary sector were much less secure. Unstable product
demand prevented firms from ensuring long-term employment. Furthermore,
production processes in this segment were labor-intensive and involved simple
or repetitive tasks so workers were interchangeable. Stable working habits were
discouraged as a result and there was little opportunity for career advancement.
The secondary labor market was connected to the primary labor market through
such means as subcontracting but “many adults are unable to escape from it and
spend much or all of their lives there” (ibid., 690). Secondary workers thus played
an important role in the economy because the primary sector was dependent
upon their employment for such services as subcontracting, but they were also
expendable. In effect, the secondary labor market was the modern Marxists’
equivalent to the reserve army of the unemployed. Competition kept wages low
among a group of people without which the economy could not function.
Labor market segmentation went beyond this general distinction between
primary and secondary sectors. Piore (1972) further segmented the primary labor
sector into upper and lower tiers. Workers in the upper tier held management jobs,
90

which conferred higher status and pay, and greater economic security. There were
relatively high turnover rates but this was attributed to career advancement rather
than termination. Members of the lower tier of the primary sector were regularly
employed blue collar workers. Workers adhered to a strict set of work rules that
were predicated upon the hegemonic relationship between worker and supervisor.
Each segment had a different “mobility chain” that signified the opportunity for
career advancement (Piore, 1972, 6). Workers in the upper tier had the most
opportunity for promotion, the lower tier was more rigid, whereas there was little
chance for advancement in the secondary labor market.
Race was cited as one of the primary causes of labor market segmentation.
Segmentation by race arose from “certain jobs that are ‘race-typed,’ segregated
by prejudice and labor market institutions,” (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 360).
This was compounded by geographic separation of employment opportunities,
which hindered the flow of labor. Harrison (1972) found that underemployment
and poverty persisted in urban ghettoes, due to a lack of economic opportunity
for minorities. Minorities were considerably limited to a selection of “typically
urban” jobs that prevented workers from fully recognizing their productive
potentials (Harrison, 1972, 811). There were thus jobs that were often associated
with specific races located in specific geographic areas. According to segmented
labor markets, social institutions were the most important factor in determining
the distribution of personal income. Workers with higher levels of productivity
did earn higher incomes, but the access to investments that increased productivity
was determined by social institutions prevailing at the time.
Segmented labor market theory presented a heterodox alternative in
the proliferation of theories of personal income distribution in the mid-twentieth
century. While human capital theory offered an explanation for personal income
distribution within a marginal productivity framework, segmented labor market
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theory stressed the importance of social institutions to the determination of
income distribution among individuals. It therefore appeared that two polemic
approaches to the analysis of personal income distribution developed during the
renaissance of income distribution analysis.
V.

Reconciling Human Capital Theory and Segmented Labor Market
Theory
Previous work has been done comparing the relationship between

mainstream orthodox economics and the heterodox alternative. Rebitzer (1993)
argued that “radical and mainstream neoclassical labor economics have exerted
an important influence on the other” (Rebitzer, 1396). A relationship could
therefore be drawn between the two, despite their presumably opposed theoretical
foundations. But despite making this connection, Rebitzer treats neoclassical and
radical approaches to labor market segmentation separately (ibid., 1412). Thus
while there was significant overlap between the competing theories of personal
income distribution, they were still distinct. A closer examination of the human
capital theory and segmented labor market theory literature, however, reveals an
even greater degree of overlap than suggested by Rebitzer, so much so that they
effectively become identical.
The treatment of class conflict by human capital theory was one of
the major points of contention segmented labor market theorists had with the
orthodox approach to personal income distribution. Proponents of segmented
labor markets argued that human capital theory “formally excludes the relevance
of class and class conflict to the explication of labor market phenomena” (Bowles
and Gintis, 75). One of the fundamental underpinnings that segmented labor
market theorists built upon when responding to human capital theory was the
argument that human capital theory artificially resolved class conflict by making
everyone a capitalist. Segmented labor market theorists believed that the persistent
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significance of sorting workers into groups “is neither explained nor predicted
by orthodox theory” (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 359). Although segmented
labor market theory championed itself as a theory of personal income distribution
that had corrected the theoretical flaws in human capital theory, it was not the
dramatic departure from orthodox theory promised. Reconciliation between these
competing theories is therefore not only possible, but relatively straightforward.
It is not entirely correct for critics of human capital theory to argue that it
“predicts that labor market differences among groups will decline over time” (ibid.,
359). Human capital theorists implicitly acknowledged the importance of social
institutions when explaining how individuals decided on the amount of human
capital to invest in. Accumulation of human capital was restricted by “legal and
other obstacles to financing investment in human capital” (Becker and Chiswick,
1966, 359). Important social institutions such as inheritance of property income
and availability of scholarships and loans were crucial factors that workers had to
consider when making their investment decisions regarding human capital. Since
the type of employment available to applicants was determined by the amount
of training and education they embodied, social institutions had direct influence
on the personal distribution of income in human capital theory. The influence of
social institutions was thus an integral part of human capital theory and served
to perpetuate differences between groups of workers. To argue that differences
between groups would decline over time necessarily implies a convergence of
social institutions that allowed everyone equal opportunity to invest in human
capital, and that everyone benefited equally from this investment.
More importantly, segmented labor markets themselves are implicitly
developed in human capital theory. The type of profession available to workers,
according to human capital theory, depended on their investment in human capital.
Once people decide how much to invest, they are effectively sorted into labor
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market segments according to the level of training they have acquired. Workers
then remain in their assigned segment. Human capital theorists develop their
concept of segmented labor markets by referring to the stream of income as the
life-path of earnings determined by investment in human capital. The notion of
mobility chains held by segmented labor market theorists articulated a similar
progression. Furthermore, both theories speak of stations as points along the lifepath of earnings or mobility chain.
Mincer (1958) effectively argued that workers were more unlikely
to switch professions in other industries and job categories once they decided
how much to invest in human capital because life-paths of earnings existed for
each occupation. Jobs could be sorted by “occupational rank” (Mincer, 1958,
288). Higher occupational rank led to higher income and greater social standing,
which resulted in steeper life-paths of earnings. Workers gained experience and
became more productive the longer they remained in a profession and moved
up their respective life-paths of earnings (ibid., 287). There was therefore little
incentive for workers to switch professions. They would not be able to obtain
a job of higher occupational rank because they invested too little in human
capital and were thus unqualified for such positions. Switching to a profession
of lower occupational rank was irrational because doing so required sacrificing a
steeper life-path of earning for a flatter life-path of earning, as well as movement
down the new life-path of earning to reflect the lost experience from switching
professions. Segmented labor market theory therefore essentially reiterated the
notion of segmented labor markets developed by human capital theory.
Entry into stations occupying the primary labor market of segmented
labor market theory was similarly regulated in human capital theory. Segmented
labor market theory argued that “the educational system does much more than
produce human capital,” (Bowles and Gintis, 1975, 78). Segmented labor market
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theorists believed that the existence of meritocratic society that gave members of
one group power over another group. While there was small window for young
workers to escape the secondary labor market, most did not. Only those who
obtained “bridge” jobs in such fields as metal-working could facilitate intersegment mobility (Osterman, 1975, 514). Workers who were unable to enter
the primary labor market early were trapped in the secondary labor market.
Human capital theory developed rigid barriers to entry to labor markets prior to
the development of segmented labor market theory. The belief that entry into
professions was regulated by investment in human capital implied the existence
of a meritocratic society from a human capital theory perspective. Furthermore,
windows of opportunity were also an important aspect of human capital theory.
Once individuals decided how much human capital to invest in, their window
of opportunity effectively closed because they had sorted themselves into their
respective professions.
There is thus a common perception of segmented labor markets and a
labor market hierarchy. Both human capital and segmented labor market theories
of personal income distribution promoted the notion of a rigid stratification of the
labor market in which “each occupation is seen as a set in a stratum of society
defined by income and way of life” (Brown, 1977, 118). Workers will be sorted
into their stations at a fairly early age. Segmented labor market theory argues
that this sorting is governed by social institutions. Human capital theory argues
that it is determined by the level of investment made in human capital, which
itself is influenced by social institutions. But regardless of how this sorting is
actually conducted, both human capital theory and segmented labor theory argue
that its effects are lasting. Once the sorting process is completed, it is uncommon
for workers to move between segments. Thus contrary to a gradual decline in
differences between groups of workers, human capital theory implies that there
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is a tendency for them to endure, and even strengthen, over time. A worker
sorted into a lower segment of the labor market was not likely to move into the
upper segment and subsequently propagate the benefits of greater opportunity for
investment in human capital upon future generations.
It is therefore difficult for supporters of segmented labor market theory
to criticize human capital theory when the implications of each theory of personal
income distribution are so similar. Human capital theory argues that segmented
labor markets are the result of individual choice. People face constraints on the
amount of human capital they can invest in, but within these constraints people are
free to choose any level of investment they want. While segmented labor market
theory also shows how labor market segmentation persists, it treats the origins
of labor market segmentation as exogenous: the prevailing social institutions
determined where in the labor market hierarchy an individual ultimately ended up.
The largest theoretical difference between the two is thus a matter of endogeneity.
This is ironic because Bowles and Gintis cite “the assumption of exogenously
determined individual preferences” as a shortcoming of human capital theory
while failing to recognize that segmented labor market theory is endogenous only
to the extent that it explains how segmented labor markets reproduce themselves
from an exogenously determined origin (Bowles and Gintis, 81).
The above criticisms are based on the argument that human capital theory
does not account for the importance of social institutions in the determination
of an individual’s income.

Yet as the discussion above demonstrates, this

argument can be clearly and concisely refuted. Human capital theory implicitly
incorporates social institutions into its theoretical framework, and does develop
a notion of segmented labor markets, but it is not manifested in the same way
as segmented labor market theory. The influence of social institutions is much
more implicit in human capital theory because human capital theory implicitly
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factors them into individual decisions to invest in human capital. Therefore a
more accurate assessment of human capital theory is that human capital theory
assumes that individual incomes are determined by the level of investment made
by individuals, given their unique constraints which are the product of social
institutions. Segmented labor market theory makes these constraints much more
rigid, diminishing the impact of individual choice. This, however, does not
preclude the undeniable similarities underpinning the theoretical frameworks of
orthodox and heterodox theories of personal income distribution, respectively.
VI.

Conclusion
To argue that the late-twentieth century ushered income distribution

in from the cold implies that its importance to economic theory had faded and
needed to be revived. It is important to recognize the renaissance of income
distribution theory in the mid-twentieth century. Atkinson failed to acknowledge
the important contributions of human capital and segmented labor market theories
of personal income distribution, instead choosing to cite development economics
as the primary focus of income distribution in the twentieth century. In reality the
twentieth century saw a great debate emerge over competing theories of personal
income distribution, a debate that appeared to represent a wider gap than the one
between classical and Marxian class theories of income distribution.
Ricardo and Marx developed class theories of income distribution to
explain the class conflict that dominated European society during the rise of
classical political economy. Each acknowledged the importance of the rate of
profit to class distributions of income, but from this common point of emphasis
their analyses diverged considerably. The divergence in class theories of income
distribution was due primarily to competing beliefs about the sustainability of the
capitalist system of production. Ricardo believed a falling rate of profit regulated
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capitalist accumulation: capitalists were competitive but could coexist. Marx,
on the other hand, deemed capitalism unsustainable. The capitalist thirst for
accumulation was driven by an eat-or-be-eaten urgency. Accumulation meant
survival and as capital became more concentrated, capitalist oppression grew to
such an extent that it would help spark a proletariat uprising.
Neither Ricardo nor Marx attempted to develop a theory of personal
income distribution because the labor force at the time was relatively homogenous,
and they were living during an era of intense class competition, as evidenced by the
Corn Laws. The primary concerns facing economists during the era of classical
political economy were thus much more related to classes than individuals. The
dominance of class theories of income distribution persisted until Clark introduced
the notion that factors were paid according to their marginal productivity. He
did not explain how marginal productivity was determined, however, choosing
instead to merely state that there was a relationship between the two. Neoclassical
economists developed theories of personal income distribution that sufficiently
explained how marginal productivity influenced income. Human capital theory
emerged as an important theory of personal income distribution but faced many
critics. One group of critics, heavily influenced by Marxism, argued that income
distribution on the individual level was determined by the social institutions of
capitalist society. They developed segmented labor market theory in response
to human capital theory and it appeared that an even greater divide over income
distribution theory surfaced than the one between Ricardo and Marx.
Growing interest in discrimination and increasing heterogeneity of the
labor force also encouraged the development of theories of personal income
distribution. In short, the consensus that all labor was easily substitutable,
which had persisted since classical political economy, began to break down.
Economists began operating under the assumption that laborers were not easily
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interchangeable. Drawing upon the limitations of Clark’s The Distribution of
Wealth, numerous theories of personal income distribution were developed.
Among them, human capital theory and segmented labor market theory emerged
as the most influential orthodox and heterodox theories, respectively.
Yet upon closer examination, the presumed differences between human
capital theory and segmented labor market theory can be reconciled to a large
extent. Segmented labor market theory faults human capital theory for ignoring
the role of social institutions and a segmented labor-force in the distribution of
personal income. Human capital theory, however, implies that labor markets
are segmented, and that barriers to entry in the labor market are largely due to
social institutions. Workers were sorted according to the amount of human capital
they embodied. Investment in human capital, which was constrained by the
environment produced by social institutions, thus acted as a barrier to entry. The
most significant difference between the two is the amount of freedom in workers’
initial employment decisions. Human capital theory argues that segmented labor
markets are essentially a product of individual choice while segmented labor
market theory asserts that segmented labor markets are pre-assigned.
Not only were there numerous important contributions to income
distribution theory during the period it was supposedly out in the cold, a close
connection between human capital and segmented labor market theories of personal
income distribution developed. Segmented labor market theory was essentially
a modification of human capital theory, placing more explicit emphasis on the
role of social institutions in the explanation of individual income distribution.
Although this distinction may seem nuanced, it is important to recognize that
segmented labor market theory is not entirely redundant. Segmented labor market
theory stresses the importance of social institutions while human capital theory
acknowledges their influence much more implicitly. Professor Atkinson may have
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had a valid argument that income distribution theory had become too focused on
development economics, but the twentieth century was the most important era of
income distribution analysis since classical political economy.
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